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Adam Bjorndahl and Aybu¨ke O¨zgu¨n
Abstract
In recent work, Stalnaker proposes a logical framework in which belief is realized as a
weakened form of knowledge [30]. Building on Stalnaker’s core insights, and using frameworks
developed in [11] and [4], we employ topological tools to refine and, we argue, improve on this
analysis. The structure of topological subset spaces allows for a natural distinction between
what is known and (roughly speaking) what is knowable; we argue that the foundational axioms
of Stalnaker’s system rely intuitively on both of these notions. More precisely, we argue that
the plausibility of the principles Stalnaker proposes relating knowledge and belief relies on
a subtle equivocation between an “evidence-in-hand” conception of knowledge and a weaker
“evidence-out-there” notion of what could come to be known. Our analysis leads to a trimodal
logic of knowledge, knowability, and belief interpreted in topological subset spaces in which
belief is definable in terms of knowledge and knowability. We provide a sound and complete
axiomatization for this logic as well as its uni-modal belief fragment. We then consider weaker
logics that preserve suitable translations of Stalnaker’s postulates, yet do not allow for any
reduction of belief. We propose novel topological semantics for these irreducible notions of
belief, generalizing our previous semantics, and provide sound and complete axiomatizations
for the corresponding logics.
1 Introduction
Epistemology has long been concerned with the relationship between knowledge and belief. There is
a long tradition of attempting to strengthen the latter to attain a satisfactory notion of the former:
belief might be improved to true belief, to “justified” true belief, to “correctly justified” true belief
[14], to “undefeated justified” true belief [25, 26, 23, 24], and so on (see, e.g, [22, 29] for a survey).
There has also been some interest in reversing this project—deriving belief from knowledge—or, at
least, putting “knowledge first” [40]. In this spirit, Stalnaker has proposed a framework in which
belief is realized as a weakened form of knowledge [30]. More precisely, beginning with a logical
system in which both belief and knowledge are represented as primitives, Stalnaker formalizes some
natural-seeming relationships between the two, and proves on the basis of these relationships that
belief can be defined out of knowledge.
This project is of both conceptual and technical interest. Philosophically speaking, it provides
a new perspective from which to investigate knowledge, belief, and their interplay. Mathematically,
it offers a potential route by which to represent belief in formal systems that are designed to handle
only knowledge. Both these themes underlie the present work. Building on Stalnaker’s core insights,
we employ topological tools to refine and, we argue, improve on Stalnaker’s original system.
Our work brings together two distinct lines of research. Stalnaker’s epistemic-doxastic axioms
have motivated and inspired several prior topological proposals for the semantics of belief [28, 2,
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5, 4], including most recently and most notably a proposal by Baltag et al. [4] that is essentially
recapitulated in our strongest logic for belief (Section 3). Our development of this logic, however
(as well as the new, weaker logics we study in Section 4), relies crucially on a semantic framework
defined in recent work by Bjorndahl [11] that distinguishes what is known from (roughly speaking)
what is knowable.
We argue that the foundational axioms of Stalnaker’s system rely intuitively on both of these
notions at various points. More precisely, we argue that the plausibility of the principles Stalnaker
proposes relating knowledge and belief relies on a subtle equivocation between an “evidence-in-
hand” conception of knowledge and a weaker “evidence-out-there” notion of what could come to
be known. As such, we find it quite natural to study Stalnaker’s principles in the richer semantic
setting developed in [11], which is based on topological subset spaces, a class of epistemic models of
growing interest in recent years [27, 15, 11, 34, 35]. These models support a careful reworking of
Stalnaker’s system in a manner that respects the distinction described above, yielding a trimodal
logic of knowledge, knowability, and belief that is our main object of study.
Subset spaces have been employed in the representation of a variety of epistemic notions, includ-
ing knowledge, learning, and public announcement (see, e.g., [27, 19, 9, 8, 1, 39, 38, 20]), but to the
best of our knowledge this paper contains the first formalization of belief in subset space semantics.
Stalnaker’s original system is an extension of the basic logic of knowledge S4; belief emerges as a
standard KD45 modality, as it is often assumed to be, while knowledge turns out to satisfy the
stronger but somewhat less common S4.2 axioms. Our system, by contrast, is an extension of the
basic bimodal logic of knowledge-and-knowability introduced in [11]; belief is similarly KD45, while
knowledge is S5 and knowability is S4; thus, our approach preserves what are arguably the desirable
properties of belief while cleanly dividing “knowledge” into two conceptually distinct and familiar
logical constructs.
In Stalnaker’s system, belief can be defined in terms of knowledge; in our system, we prove
that belief can be defined in terms of knowledge and knowability (Proposition 3). This yields a
purely topological interpretation of belief that coincides with that previously proposed by Baltag
et al. [4]: roughly speaking, while knowledge is interpreted (as usual) as “truth in all possible
alternatives”, belief becomes “truth in most possible alternatives”, with the meaning of “most”
cashed out topologically. The conceptual underpinning of this interpretation of belief as developed
by Baltag et al., and its connection to the present work, is discussed further in Section 5.
In this richer topological setting, the translation of Stalnaker’s postulates do not in themselves
entail that belief is reducible to knowledge (or even knowledge-and-knowability): our character-
ization of belief in these terms relies on two additional principles we call “weak factivity” and
“confident belief”. This motivates the study of weaker logical systems obtained by rejecting one
or both of these principles. We initiate the investigation of these systems by proposing novel
topological semantics that aim to capture the corresponding, irreducible notions of belief.
This rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present Stalnaker’s original
system, motivate our objections to it, and introduce the formal logical framework that supports
our revision. In Section 3 we present our revised system, explore its relationship to Stalnaker’s
system, and prove an analogue to Stalnaker’s characterization result: belief can be defined out of
knowledge and knowability. We also establish that our system is sound and complete with respect
to the class of topological subset models, and that the pure logic of belief it embeds is axiomatized
by the standard KD45 system. In Section 4 we investigate weaker logics as discussed above and
develop the semantic tools needed to interpret belief in this more general context; we also provide
soundness and completeness results for each of these logics. Section 5 concludes. Due to length
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restrictions, several of the longer proofs are omitted from the main body; we include them for
reference in Appendix A.
2 Knowledge, Knowability, and Belief
Given unary modalities ⋆1, . . . , ⋆k, let L⋆1,...,⋆k denote the propositional language recursively gen-
erated by
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ |ϕ ∧ ψ | ⋆i ϕ,
where p ∈ prop, the (countable) set of primitive propositions, and 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Our focus in this
paper is the trimodal language LK,✷,B and various fragments thereof, where we read Kϕ as “the
agent knows ϕ”, ✷ϕ as “ϕ is knowable” or “the agent could come to know ϕ”, and Bϕ as “the
agent believes ϕ”. The Boolean connectives ∨, → and ↔ are defined as usual, and ⊥ is defined as
an abbreviation for p ∧ ¬p. We also employ Kˆ as an abbreviation for ¬K¬, ✸ for ¬✷¬, and Bˆ for
¬B¬.
(K⋆) ⊢ ⋆(ϕ→ ψ)→ (⋆ϕ→ ⋆ψ) Distribution
(D⋆) ⊢ ⋆ϕ→ ¬ ⋆ ¬ϕ Consistency
(T⋆) ⊢ ⋆ϕ→ ϕ Factivity
(4⋆) ⊢ ⋆ϕ→ ⋆ ⋆ ϕ Positive introspection
(.2⋆) ⊢ ¬ ⋆ ¬ ⋆ ϕ→ ⋆¬ ⋆ ¬ϕ Directedness
(5⋆) ⊢ ¬ ⋆ ϕ→ ⋆¬ ⋆ ϕ Negative introspection
(Nec⋆) from ⊢ ϕ infer ⊢ ⋆ϕ Necessitation
Table 1: Some axiom schemes and a rule of inference for ⋆
Let CPL denote an axiomatization of classical propositional logic. Then, following standard
naming conventions, we define the following logical systems:
K⋆ = CPL + (K⋆) + (Nec⋆)
S4⋆ = K⋆ + (T⋆) + (4⋆)
S4.2⋆ = S4⋆ + (.2⋆)
S5⋆ = S4⋆ + (5⋆)
KD45⋆ = K⋆ + (D⋆) + (4⋆) + (5⋆).
2.1 Stalnaker’s system
Stalnaker [30] works with the language LK,B , augmenting the logic S4K with the additional axioms
schemes presented in Table 2. Let Stal denote this combined logic. Stalnaker proves that this system
yields the pure belief logic KD45B ; moreover, he shows that Stal proves the following equivalence:
Bϕ↔ KˆKϕ. Thus, belief in this system is reducible to knowledge; every formula of LK,B can be
translated into a provably equivalent formula in LK . Stalnaker also shows that although only the
S4K system is assumed for knowledge, Stal actually derives the stronger system S4.2K .
What justifies the assumption of these particular properties of knowledge and belief? It is, of
course, possible to object to any of them (including the features of knowledge picked out by the
system S4K); however, in this paper we focus on the relationships expressed in (KB) and (FB).
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(DB) ⊢ Bϕ→ ¬B¬ϕ Consistency of belief
(sPI) ⊢ Bϕ→ KBϕ Strong positive introspection
(sNI) ⊢ ¬Bϕ→ K¬Bϕ Strong negative introspection
(KB) ⊢ Kϕ→ Bϕ Knowledge implies belief
(FB) ⊢ Bϕ→ BKϕ Full belief
Table 2: Stalnaker’s additional axiom schemes
That knowing implies believing is widely taken for granted—loosely speaking, it corresponds to a
conception of knowledge as a special kind of belief. Full belief,1 on the other hand, may seem more
contentious; this is because it is keyed to a rather strong notion of belief. The English verb “to
believe” has a variety of uses that vary quite a bit in the nature of the attitude ascribed to the
subject. For example, the sentence, “I believe Mary is in her office, but I’m not sure” makes a
clearly possibilistic claim, whereas, “I believe that nothing can travel faster than the speed of light”
might naturally be interpreted as expressing a kind of certainty. It is this latter sense of belief
that Stalnaker seeks to capture: belief as subjective certainty. On this reading, (FB) essentially
stipulates that being certain is not subjectively distinguishable from knowing: an agent who feels
certain that ϕ is true also feels certain that she knows that ϕ is true.
At a high level, then, each of (KB) and (FB) have a certain plausibility. Crucially, however,
we contend that their joint plausibility is predicated on an abstract conception of knowledge that
permits a kind of equivocation. In particular, tension between the two emerges when knowledge is
interpreted more concretely in terms of what is justified by a body of evidence.
Consider the following informal account of knowledge: an agent knows something just in case it
is entailed by the available evidence. To be sure, this is still vague since we have not yet specified
what “evidence” is or what “available” means (we return to formalize these notions in Section 2.2).
But it is motivated by a very commonsense interpretation of knowledge, as for example in a card
game when one player is said to know their opponent is not holding two aces on the basis of the
fact that they are themselves holding three aces.
Even at this informal level, one can see that something like this conception of knowledge lies
at the root of the standard possible worlds semantics for epistemic logic. Roughly speaking, such
semantics work as follows: each world w is associated with a set of accessible worlds R(w), and the
agent is said to know ϕ at w just in case ϕ is true at all worlds in R(w). A standard intuition for
this interpretation of knowledge is given in terms of evidence: the worlds in R(w) are exactly those
compatible with the agent’s evidence at w, and so the agent knows ϕ just in case the evidence rules
out all not-ϕ possibilities. Suppose, for instance, that you have measured your height and obtained
a reading of 5 feet and 10 inches ±1 inch. With this measurement in hand, you can be said to know
that you are less than 6 feet tall, having ruled out the possibility that you are taller.
Call this the evidence-in-hand conception of knowledge. Observe that it fits well with the (KB)
principle: evidence-in-hand that entails ϕ should surely also cause you to believe ϕ. On the other
hand, it does not sit comfortably with (FB): presumably you can be (subjectively) certain of ϕ
without simultaneously being certain that you currently have evidence-in-hand that guarantees ϕ,
lest we lose the distinction between belief and knowledge.2 However, the intuition for (FB) can be
1Stalnaker calls this property “strong belief” but we, following [2, 3], adopt the term “full belief” instead.
2This assumes, roughly speaking, that evidence-in-hand is “transparent” in the sense that the agent cannot be
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recovered by shifting the meaning of “available evidence” to a weaker existential claim: that there
is evidence entailing ϕ—even if you don’t happen to personally have it in hand at the moment.
This corresponds to a transition from the known to the knowable. On this account, (FB) is recast
as “If you are certain of ϕ, then you are certain that there is evidence entailing ϕ”, a sort of
dictum of responsible belief: do not believe anything unless you think you could come to know
it. Returning to (KB), on the other hand, we see that it is not supported by this weaker sense of
evidence-availability: the fact that you could, in principle, discover evidence entailing ϕ should not
in itself imply that you believe ϕ.
This way of reconciling Stalnaker’s proposed axioms with an evidence-based account of knowledge—
namely, by carefully distinguishing between knowledge and knowability—is the focus of the remain-
der of this paper. We begin by defining a class of models rich enough to interpret both of these
modalities at once.
2.2 Topological subset models
A subset space is a pair (X, S) where X is a nonempty set of worlds and S ⊆ 2X is a collection
of subsets of X . A subset model X = (X, S, v) is a subset space (X, S) together with a function
v : prop→ 2X specifying, for each primitive proposition p ∈ prop, its extension v(p).
Subset space semantics interpret formulas not at worlds x but at epistemic scenarios of the
form (x, U), where x ∈ U ∈ S. Let ES(X) denote the collection of all such pairs in X. Given an
epistemic scenario (x, U) ∈ ES(X), the set U is called its epistemic range; intuitively, it represents
the agent’s current information as determined, for example, by the measurements she has taken.
We interpret LK in X as follows:
(X, x, U) |= p iff x ∈ v(p)
(X, x, U) |= ¬ϕ iff (X, x, U) 6|= ϕ
(X, x, U) |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff (X, x, U) |= ϕ and (X, x, U) |= ψ
(X, x, U) |= Kϕ iff (∀y ∈ U)((X, y, U) |= ϕ).
Thus, knowledge is cashed out as truth in all epistemically possible worlds, analogously to the
standard semantics for knowledge in relational models. A formula ϕ is said to be satisfiable in X
if there is some (x, U) ∈ ES(X) such that (X, x, U) |= ϕ, and valid in X if for all (x, U) ∈ ES(X)
we have (X, x, U) |= ϕ. The set
[[ϕ]]U
X
= {x ∈ U : (X, x, U) |= ϕ}
is called the extension of ϕ under U . We sometimes drop mention of the subset model X when
it is clear from context.
Subset space models are well-equipped to give an account of evidence-based knowledge and its
dynamics. Elements of S can be thought of as potential pieces of evidence, while the epistemic
range U of an epistemic scenario (x, U) corresponds to the “evidence-in-hand” by means of which
the agent’s knowledge is evaluated. This is made precise in the semantic clause for Kϕ, which
stipulates that the agent knows ϕ just in case ϕ is entailed by the evidence-in-hand.
In this framework, stronger evidence corresponds to a smaller epistemic range, and whether a
given proposition can come to be known corresponds (roughly speaking) to whether there exists a
mistaken about what evidence she has or what it entails. A model rich enough to represent this kind of uncertainty
about evidence might therefore be of interest; we leave the development of such a model to other work.
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sufficiently strong piece of (true) evidence that entails it. This notion is naturally and succinctly
formalized topologically.
A topological space is a pair (X,T) where X is a nonempty set and T ⊆ 2X is a collection
of subsets of X that covers X and is closed under finite intersections and arbitrary unions. The
collection T is called a topology on X and elements of T are called open sets. In what follows we
assume familiarity with basic topological notions; for a general introduction to topology we refer
the reader to [16, 17].
A topological subset model is a subset model X = (X,T, v) in which T is a topology on
X . Clearly every topological space is a subset space. But topological spaces possess additional
structure that enables us to study the kinds of epistemic dynamics we are interested in. More
precisely, we can capture a notion of knowability via the following definition: for A ⊆ X , say that
x lies in the interior of A if there is some U ∈ T such that x ∈ U ⊆ A. The set of all points in the
interior of A is denoted int(A); it is easy to see that int(A) is the largest open set contained in A.
Given an epistemic scenario (x, U) and a primitive proposition p, we have x ∈ int([[p]]U ) precisely
when there is some evidence V ∈ T that is true at x and that entails p. We therefore interpret the
extended language LK,✷ that includes the “knowable” modality in X via the additional recursive
clause
(X, x, U) |= ✷ϕ iff x ∈ int([[ϕ]]U ).
The formula ✷ϕ thus represents knowability as a restricted existential claim over the set T of
available pieces of evidence. The dual modality correspondingly satisfies
(X, x, U) |= ✸ϕ iff x ∈ cl([[ϕ]]U ),
where cl denotes the topological closure operator.3 Since the formula ✷¬ϕ reads as “the agent could
come to know that ϕ is false”, one intuitive reading of its negation, ✸ϕ, is “ϕ is unfalsifiable”.
It is worth noting that the intuition behind reading ✷ϕ as “ϕ is knowable” can falter when ϕ
is itself an epistemic formula. In particular, if ϕ is the Moore sentence p ∧ ¬Kp, then Kϕ is not
satisfiable in any subset model, so in this sense ϕ can never be known; nonetheless, ✷ϕ is satisfiable.
Loosely speaking, this is because our language abstracts away from the implicit temporal dimension
of knowability; ✷ϕ might be more accurately glossed as “one could come to know what ϕ used to
express (before you came to know it)”.4 Since primitive propositions do not change their truth
value based on the agent’s epistemic state, this subtlety is irrelevant for propositional knowledge
and knowability. For the purposes of this paper, we opt for the simplified “knowability” gloss of
the ✷ modality, and leave further investigation of this subtlety to future work.
3 Stalnaker’s System Revised
Like Stalnaker, we augment a basic logic of knowledge with some additional axiom schemes that
speak to the relationship between belief and knowledge. Unlike Stalnaker, however, we work with
3It is not hard to see that [[✷ϕ]]U = int([[ϕ]]U ) as one might expect; however, since the closure of [[ϕ]]U need not
be a subset of U , we have [[✸ϕ]]U = cl([[ϕ]]U ) ∩ U .
4This reading suggests a strong link to conditional belief modalities, which are meant to capture an agent’s revised
beliefs about how the world was before learning the new information. More precisely, a conditional belief formula
Bϕψ is read as “if the agent would learn ϕ, then she would come to believe that ψ was the case (before the learning)”
[7, p. 14]. Borrowing this interpretation, we might say that ✷ϕ represents hypothetical, conditional knowledge of ϕ
where the condition consists in having some piece of evidence V entailing ϕ as evidence-in-hand: “if the agent were
to have V as evidence-in-hand, she would know ϕ was the case (before having had the evidence)”.
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the language LK,✷,B and take as our “basic logic of knowledge” the system
ELK,✷ = S5K + S4✷ + (KI),
where (KI) denotes the axiom scheme Kϕ → ✷ϕ. As noted in Section 2.1, the evidence-in-hand
conception of knowledge captured by the semantics for K is based on the premise that evidence-in-
hand is completely transparent to the agent. That is, the agent is aware that she has the evidence
she does and of what it entails and does not entail. In this sense, the agent is fully introspective
with regard to the evidence-in-hand, and as such, K naturally emerges as an S5-type modality.
The system ELK,✷ was defined by Bjorndahl [11] and shown to be exactly the logic of topological
subset spaces.
Theorem 1 ([11]). ELK,✷ is a sound and complete axiomatization of LK,✷ with respect to the class
of all topological subset spaces: for every ϕ ∈ LK,✷, ϕ is provable in ELK,✷ if and only if ϕ is valid
in all topological subset models.
We strengthen ELK,✷ with the additional axiom schemes given in Table 3. Let SELK,✷,B denote
(KB) ⊢ B(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Bϕ→ Bψ) Distribution of belief
(sPI) ⊢ Bϕ→ KBϕ Strong positive introspection
(KB) ⊢ Kϕ→ Bϕ Knowledge implies belief
(RB) ⊢ Bϕ→ B✷ϕ Responsible belief
(wF) ⊢ Bϕ→ ✸ϕ Weak factivity
(CB) ⊢ B(✷ϕ ∨✷¬✷ϕ) Confident belief
Table 3: Additional axioms schemes for SELK,✷,B
the resulting logic. (sPI) and (KB) occur here just as they do in Stalnaker’s original system (Table
2), and though (KB) is not an axiom of Stal, it is derivable in that system. The remaining axioms
involve the ✷ modality and thus cannot themselves be part of Stalnaker’s system; however, if we
forget the distinction between ✷ and K (and between ✸ and Kˆ), all of them do hold in Stal, as
made precise in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. Let t : LK,✷,B → LK,B be the map that replaces each instance of ✷ with K. Then
for every ϕ that is an instance of an axiom scheme from Table 3, we have ⊢Stal t(ϕ).
Proof. This is trivial for (sPI), (KB), and (RB). (KB) follows immediately from the fact that Stal
validates KD45B . After applying t, (wF) becomes Bϕ → Kˆϕ, which follows easily from the fact
that ⊢Stal Bϕ ↔ KˆKϕ. Finally, under t, (CB) becomes B(Kϕ ∨ K¬Kϕ), which follows directly
from the aforementioned equivalence together with the fact that ⊢S4K KˆK(Kϕ ∨K¬Kϕ).
Thus, modulo the distinction between knowledge and knowablity, we make no assumptions be-
yond what follows from Stalnaker’s own stipulations. Of course, the distinction between knowledge
and knowability is crucial for us. Responsible belief differs from full belief in that K is replaced
by ✷, exactly as motivated in Section 2.1; it says that if you are sure of ϕ, then you must also
be sure that there is some evidence that entails ϕ. Weak factivity and confident belief do not
directly correspond to any of Stalnaker’s axioms, but they are necessary to establish an analogue of
Stalnaker’s reduction of belief to knowledge (Proposition 3). Of course, one need not adopt these
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principles; indeed, rejecting them allows one to assent to the spirit of Stalnaker’s premises without
committing oneself to his conclusion that belief can be defined out of knowledge (or knowability).
We return in Section 4 to consider weaker logics that omit one or both of (wF) and (CB).
Weak factivity can be understood, given (KI), as a strengthening of the formula Bϕ → Kˆϕ
(which is provable in Stal). Intuitively, it says that if you are certain of ϕ, then ϕmust be compatible
with all the available evidence (in hand or not). Thus, while belief is not required to be factive—you
can believe false things—(wF) does impose a weaker kind of connection to the world—you cannot
believe knowably false things.
Confident belief expresses a kind of faith in the justificatory power of evidence. Consider the
disjunction ✷ϕ∨✷¬✷ϕ, which says that ϕ is either knowable or, if not, that you could come to know
that it is unknowable. This is equivalent to the negative introspection axiom for the ✷ modality,
and does not hold in general; topologically speaking, it fails at the boundary points of the extension
of ✷ϕ—where no measurement can entail ϕ yet every measurement leaves open the possibility that
some further measurement will. What (CB) stipulates is that the agent is sure that they are not in
such a “boundary case”—that every formula ϕ is either knowable or, if not, knowably unknowable.
Stalnaker’s reduction of belief to knowledge has an analogue in this setting: every formula in
LK,✷,B is provably equivalent to a formula in LK,✷ via the following equivalence.
Proposition 3. The formula Bϕ↔ K✸✷ϕ is provable in SELK,✷,B.
Proof. We present an abridged derivation:
1. Bϕ→ ✸✷ϕ (RB), (wF)
2. KBϕ→ K✸✷ϕ (NecK), (KK)
3. Bϕ→ KBϕ (sPI)
4. Bϕ→ K✸✷ϕ CPL: 2, 3
5. B(✷ϕ ∨ ✷¬✷ϕ) (CB)
6. (✷ϕ ∨ ✷¬✷ϕ)→ (✸✷ϕ→ ϕ) (T✷), CPL
7. B(✷ϕ ∨ ✷¬✷ϕ)→ B(✸✷ϕ→ ϕ) (NecK), (KB), (KB)
8. B(✸✷ϕ→ ϕ) CPL: 5, 7
9. B✸✷ϕ→ Bϕ (KB)
10. K✸✷ϕ→ B✸✷ϕ (KB)
11. K✸✷ϕ→ Bϕ CPL: 9, 10
12. Bϕ↔ K✸✷ϕ CPL: 4, 11.
Thus, rather than being identified with the “epistemic possibility of knowledge” [30] as in Stal-
naker’s framework, to believe ϕ in this framework is to know that the knowability of ϕ is unfalsifiable.
This is a bit of a mouthful, so consider for a moment the meaning of the subformula ✸✷ϕ: in the
informal language of evidence, this says that every piece of evidence is compatible not only with the
truth of ϕ, but with the knowability of ϕ. In other words: no possible measurement can rule out
the prospect that some further measurement will definitively establish ϕ. To believe ϕ, according
to Proposition 3, is to know this.
This equivalence also tells us exactly how to extend topological subset space semantics to the
language LK,✷,B:
(X, x, U) |= Bϕ iff (X, x, U) |= K✸✷ϕ
iff (∀y ∈ U)(y ∈ cl(int([[ϕ]]U )))
iff U ⊆ cl(int([[ϕ]]U )).
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Thus, the agent believes ϕ at (x, U) just in case the interior of [[ϕ]]U is dense in U . The collection
of sets that have dense interiors on U forms a filter,5 making it a good mathematical notion of
largeness : sets with dense interior can be thought of as taking up “most” of the space. This
provides an appealing intuition for the semantics of belief that runs parallel to that for knowledge:
the agent knows ϕ at (x, U) iff ϕ is true at all points in U , whereas the agent believes ϕ at (x, U)
iff ϕ is true at most points in U .
As mentioned in the introduction, this interpretation of belief as “truth at most points” (in a
given domain) was first studied by Baltag et al. as a topologically natural, evidence-based notion of
belief [4]. Though their motivation and conceptual underpinning differ from ours, the semantics for
belief we have derived in this section essentially coincide with those given in [4]. We discuss this
connection further in Section 5.
3.1 Technical results
Let (EQ) denote the scheme Bϕ↔ K✸✷ϕ. It turns out that this equivalence is not only provable
in SELK,✷,B, but in fact it characterizes SELK,✷,B as an extension of ELK,✷. To make this precise,
let
EL
+
K,✷ = ELK,✷ + (EQ).
We then have:
Proposition 4. EL+K,✷ and SELK,✷,B prove the same theorems.
From this it is not hard to establish soundness and completeness of SELK,✷,B:
Theorem 5. SELK,✷,B is a sound and complete axiomatization of LK,✷,B with respect to the class
of topological subset models: for every ϕ ∈ LK,✷,B, ϕ is valid in all topological subset models if and
only if ϕ is provable in SELK,✷,B.
Much work in belief representation takes the logical principles of KD45B for granted (see, e.g.,
[21, 6, 36]). An important feature of SELK,✷,B is that it derives these principles:
Proposition 6. For every ϕ ∈ LB , if ⊢KD45B ϕ, then ⊢SELK,✷,B ϕ.
In fact, KD45B is not merely derivable in our logic—it completely characterizes belief as in-
terpreted in topological models. That is, KD45B proves exactly the validities expressible in the
language LB:
Theorem 7. KD45B is a sound and complete axiomatization of LB with respect to the class of all
topological subset spaces: for every ϕ ∈ LB , ϕ is provable in KD45B if and only if ϕ is valid in all
topological subset models.
Soundness follows easily from the above. The proof of completeness is more involved; we include
it as an appendix.
5A nonempty collection of subsets forms a filter if it is closed under taking supersets and finite intersections.
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4 Weaker Notions of Belief
In Section 3, we motivated the axioms of our system SELK,✷,B in part by the fact that they al-
lowed us to achieve a reduction of belief to knowledge-and-knowability in the spirit of Stalnaker’s
result. SELK,✷,B includes several of Stalnaker original axioms (or modifications thereof), but also
two new schemes: weak factivity (wF) and confident belief (CB). As noted, if we forget the dis-
tinction between knowledge and knowability, each of these schemes holds in Stal (Proposition 2).
Nonetheless, in our tri-modal logic these two principles do not follow from the others: one can
adopt (our translations of) Stalnaker’s original principles while rejecting one or both of (wF) and
(CB). In particular, this allows one to essentially accept all of Stalnaker’s premises without being
forced to the conclusion that belief is reducible to knowledge (or even knowledge-and-knowability).
We are therefore motivated to generalize our earlier semantics in order to study weaker logics in
which the belief modality is not definable and so requires its own semantic machinery.
In this section we do just this: we augment ELK,✷ with the axiom schemes given in Table 4 to
form the logic ELK,✷,B, and prove that this system is sound and complete with respect to the new
semantics defined below. We then consider logics intermediate in strength between ELK,✷,B and
SELK,✷,B—specifically, those obtained by augmenting ELK,✷,B with the axioms (DB) (consistency
of belief), (wF), or (CB)—and establish soundness and completeness results for these logics as well.
(KB) ⊢ B(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Bϕ→ Bψ) Distribution of belief
(sPI) ⊢ Bϕ→ KBϕ Strong positive introspection
(KB) ⊢ Kϕ→ Bϕ Knowledge implies belief
(RB) ⊢ Bϕ→ B✷ϕ Responsible belief
Table 4: Additional axiom schemes for ELK,✷,B
As before, we rely on topological subset models X = (X,T, v) for the requisite semantic structure
(see Section 2.2); however, we define the evaluation of formulas with respect to epistemic-doxastic
(e-d) scenarios, which are tuples of the form (x, U, V ) where (x, U) is an epistemic scenario, V ∈ T,
and V ⊆ U . We call V the doxastic range.6
The semantic evaluation for the primitive propositions and the Boolean connectives is defined
as usual; for the modal operators, we make use of the following semantic clauses:
(X, x, U, V ) |= Kϕ iff U = [[ϕ]]U,V
(X, x, U, V ) |= ✷ϕ iff x ∈ int([[ϕ]]U,V )
(X, x, U, V ) |= Bϕ iff V ⊆ [[ϕ]]U,V ,
where
[[ϕ]]U,V = {x ∈ U : (X, x, U, V ) |= ϕ}.
Thus, the modalities K and ✷ are interpreted essentially as they were before, while the modality
B is rendered as universal quantification over the doxastic range. Intuitively, we might think of V
as the agent’s “conjecture” about the way the world is, typically stronger than what is guaranteed
by her evidence-in-hand U . On this view, states in V might be conceptualized as “more plausible”
6If we want to insist on consistent beliefs, we should add the axiom (DB): Bϕ→ Bˆϕ (or, equivalently, Bˆ⊤) and
require that V 6= ∅. We begin with the more general case, without these assumptions.
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than states in U V from the agent’s perspective, with belief being interpreted as truth in all these
more plausible states (see, e.g., [18, 31, 7, 33, 37] for more details on plausibility models for belief).
Note that we do not require that x ∈ V ; this corresponds to the intuition that the agent may have
false beliefs. Note also that none of the modalities alter either the epistemic or the doxastic range;
this is essentially what guarantees the validity of the strong introspection axioms.7
In order to distinguish these semantics from those previous, we refer to them as epistemic-
doxastic (e-d) semantics for topological subset spaces.
Theorem 8. ELK,✷,B is a sound and complete axiomatization of LK,✷,B with respect to the class
of all topological subset spaces under e-d semantics.
Call an e-d scenario (x, U, V ) consistent if V 6= ∅, and call it dense if V is dense in U (i.e., if
U ⊆ cl(V )).
Theorem 9. ELK,✷,B+(DB) is a sound and complete axiomatization of LK,✷,B with respect to the
class of all topological subset spaces under e-d semantics for consistent e-d scenarios. ELK,✷,B+(wF)
is a sound and complete axiomatization of LK,✷,B with respect to the class of all topological subset
spaces under e-d semantics for dense e-d scenarios.
4.1 Confident belief
It turns out that the strong semantics for the belief modality presented in Section 3, namely
(X, x, U) |= Bϕ iff U ⊆ cl(int([[ϕ]]U )),
does not arise as a special case of our new e-d semantics: there is no condition (e.g., density) one
can put on the doxastic range V so that these two interpretations of Bϕ agree in general. Roughly
speaking, this is because the formulas of the form ✷ϕ ∨ ✷¬✷ϕ correspond to the open and dense
sets, but in general one cannot find a (nonempty) open set V that is simultaneously contained in
every open, dense set. As such, one cannot hope to validate (CB) in the e-d semantics presented
above without also validating B⊥.
However, we can validate (CB) on topological subset spaces by altering the semantic interpreta-
tion of the belief modality so that, intuitively, it “ignores” nowhere dense sets.8 Loosely speaking,
this works because nowhere dense sets are exactly the complements of sets with dense interiors.
More precisely, we work with the same notion of e-d scenarios as before, but use the following
semantics clauses:
(X, x, U, V ) |≈ p iff x ∈ v(p)
(X, x, U, V ) |≈ ¬ϕ iff (X, x, U, V ) |6≈ ϕ
(X, x, U, V ) |≈ ϕ ∧ ψ iff (X, x, U, V ) |≈ ϕ and (X, x, U, V ) |≈ ψ
(X, x, U, V ) |≈ Kϕ iff U = [(ϕ)]U,V
(X, x, U, V ) |≈ ✷ϕ iff x ∈ int([(ϕ)]U,V )
(X, x, U, V ) |≈ Bϕ iff V ⊆∗ [(ϕ)]U,V ,
where
[(ϕ)]U,V = {x ∈ U : (X, x, U, V ) |≈ ϕ},
7We could, of course, consider even more general semantics that do not validate these axioms, but as our goal
here is to understand the role of weak factivity and confident belief in the context of Stalnaker’s reduction of belief
to knowledge, we leave such investigations to future work.
8A subset S of a topological space is called nowhere dense if its closure has empty interior: int(cl(S)) = ∅.
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and we write A ⊆∗ B iff A B is nowhere dense. In other words, we interpret everything as before
with the exception of the belief modality, which now effectively quantifies over almost all worlds in
the doxastic range V rather than over all worlds.9
Theorem 10. ELK,✷,B + (CB) is a sound and complete axiomatization of LK,✷,B with respect to
the class of all topological subset spaces under e-d semantics using the semantics given above: for all
formulas ϕ ∈ LK,✷,B, if |≈ ϕ, then ⊢ELK,✷,B+(CB) ϕ. Moreover, SELK,✷,B is sound and complete
with respect to these semantics for e-d scenarios where V = U .
5 Conclusion and Discussion
When we think of knowledge as what is entailed by the “available evidence”, a tension between two
foundational principles proposed by Stalnaker emerges. First, that whatever the available evidence
entails is believed (Kϕ → Bϕ), and second, that what is believed is believed to be entailed by
the available evidence (Bϕ → BKϕ). In the former case, it is natural to interpret “available”
as, roughly speaking, “currently in hand”, whereas in the latter, intuition better accords with a
broader interpretation of availability as referring to any evidence one could potentially access.
Being careful about this distinction leads to a natural division between what we might call
“knowledge” and “knowability”; the space of logical relationships between knowledge, knowability,
and belief turns out to be subtle and interesting. We have examined several logics meant to capture
some of these relationstips, making essential use of topological structure, which is ideally suited
to the representation of evidence and the epistemic/doxastic attitudes it informs. In this refined
setting, belief can also be defined in terms of knowledge and knowability, provided we take on two
additional principles, “weak factivity” (wF) and “confident belief” (CB); in this case, the semantics
for belief have a particularly appealing topological character: roughly speaking, a proposition is
believed just in case it is true inmost possible alternatives, where “most” is interpreted topologically
as “everywhere except on a nowhere dense set”.
This interpretation of belief first appeared in the topological belief semantics presented in [4]:
Baltag et al. take the believed propositions to be the sets with dense interiors in a given evidential
topology. Interestingly, however, although these semantics essentially coincide with those we present
in Section 3, the motivations and intuitions behind the two proposals are quite different. Baltag
et al. start with a subbase model in which the (subbasic) open sets represent pieces of evidence
that the agent has obtained directly via some observation or measurement. They do not distinguish
between evidence-in-hand and evidence-out-there as we do; moreover, the notion of belief they
seek to capture is that of justified belief, where “justification”, roughly speaking, involves having
evidence that cannot be defeated by any other available evidence. (They also consider a weaker,
defeasible type of knowledge, correctly justified belief, and obtain topological semantics for it under
which Stalnaker’s original system Stal is sound and complete.) The fact that two rather different
conceptions of belief correspond to essentially the same topological interpretation is, we feel, quite
striking, and deserves a closer look.
Despite the elegance of this topological characterization of belief, our investigation of the inter-
play between knowledge, knowability, and belief naturally leads to consideration of weaker logics in
which belief is not interpreted in this way. In particular, we focus on the principles (wF) and (CB)
and what is lost by their omission. Again we rely on topological subset models to interpret these
9Given a subset A of a topological space X, we say that a property P holds for almost all points in A just in case
A ⊆∗ {x : P (x)}.
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logics, proposing novel semantic machinery to do so. This machinery includes the introduction
of the doxastic range and, perhaps more dramatically, a modification to the semantic satisfaction
relation ( |≈ ) that builds the topological notion of “almost everywhere” quantification directly into
the foundations of the semantics. We believe this approach is an interesting area for future research,
and in this regard our soundness and completeness results may be taken as proof-of-concept.
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A Proofs
A.1 Soundness and completeness of SELK,✷,B
Let e : LK,✷,B → LK,✷ be the map that replaces each instance of B with K✸✷.
Lemma 11. For all ϕ ∈ LK,✷,B, we have ⊢EL+
K,✷
ϕ↔ e(ϕ).
Proof. This is a straightforward induction on the structure of ϕ using (EQ).
Proposition 12. EL
+
K,✷ and SELK,✷,B prove the same theorems.
Proof. In light of Proposition 3, it suffices to show that EL+K,✷ proves everything in Table 3. By
Lemma 11, then, it suffices to show that for every ϕ that is an instance of an axiom scheme from
Table 3, we have ⊢ELK,✷ e(ϕ). And for this, by Theorem 1, we need only show that each such e(ϕ)
is valid in all topological subset models.
Let X = (X,T, v) be a topological subset model and (x, U) ∈ ES(X).
(KB) Suppose (x, U) |= K✸✷(ϕ → ψ) and (x, U) |= K✸✷ϕ. Then U ⊆ cl(int([[ϕ → ψ]]U )) ∩
cl(int([[ϕ]]U )). Let y ∈ U and let V be an open set containing y. Then we must have
V ∩ int([[ϕ→ ψ]]U ) 6= ∅ and so, since this set is also open,
V ∩ int([[ϕ→ ψ]]U ) ∩ int([[ϕ]]U ) 6= ∅
∴ V ∩ int([[ϕ→ ψ]]U ∩ [[ϕ]]U ) 6= ∅
∴ V ∩ int([[ψ]]U ) 6= ∅,
which establishes that y ∈ cl(int([[ψ]]U )). This shows that U ⊆ cl(int([[ψ]]U )), and therefore
(x, U) |= K✸✷ψ.
(sPI) Suppose (x, U) |= K✸✷ϕ. Then U = [[✸✷ϕ]]U , and so for all y ∈ U we have (y, U) |= K✸✷ϕ.
This implies that U = [[K✸✷ϕ]]U , hence (x, U) |= KK✸✷ϕ.
(KB) Suppose (x, U) |= Kϕ. Then U = [[ϕ]]U , and so (since U is open), U ⊆ cl(int([[ϕ]]U )), which
implies (x, U) |= K✸✷ϕ.
(RB) Suppose (x, U) |= K✸✷ϕ. Then U ⊆ cl(int([[ϕ]]U )), so U ⊆ cl(int(int([[ϕ]]U ))), hence U =
[[✸✷✷ϕ]]U , which implies that (x, U) |= K✸✷✷ϕ.
(wF) Suppose (x, U) |= K✸✷ϕ. Then x ∈ U ⊆ cl(int([[ϕ]]U )) ⊆ cl([[ϕ]]U ), which implies that
(x, U) |= ✸ϕ.
(CB) Observe that
[[✷ϕ ∨ ✷¬✷ϕ]]U = int([[ϕ]]U ) ∪ int(X int([[ϕ]]U ))
is an open set. Moreover, it is dense in U ; to see this, let y ∈ U and let V be an open
neighbourhood of y. Then either V ∩ int([[ϕ]]U ) 6= ∅ or, if not, V ⊆ X int([[ϕ]]U ), hence
V ⊆ int(X int([[ϕ]]U )). We therefore have
U ⊆ cl(int([[✷ϕ ∨ ✷¬✷ϕ]]U )),
whence (x, U) |= K✸✷(✷ϕ ∨ ✷¬✷ϕ).
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Proposition 13. EL+K,✷ is a sound axiomatization of LK,✷,B with respect to the class of topological
subset models: for every ϕ ∈ LK,✷,B, if ϕ is provable in EL
+
K,✷ then ϕ is valid in all topological
subset models.
Proof. This follows from the soundness of ELK,✷ (Theorem 1) together with the fact that the
semantics for the B modality ensures that (EQ) is valid is all topological subset models.
Corollary 14. SELK,✷,B is a sound axiomatization of LK,✷,B with respect to the class of topological
subset models.
Proof. Immediate from Propositions 12 and 13.
Theorem 15. SELK,✷,B is a complete axiomatization of LK,✷,B with respect to the class of topo-
logical subset models: for every ϕ ∈ LK,✷,B, if ϕ is valid in all topological subset models then ϕ is
provable in SELK,✷,B.
Proof. We show the contrapositive. Let ϕ ∈ LK,✷,B be such that 6⊢SELK,✷,B ϕ. By Lemma 11 and
Proposition 12 we have ⊢SELK,✷,B ϕ ↔ e(ϕ), and so also 6⊢SELK,✷,B e(ϕ). Since e(ϕ) ∈ LK,✷ and
SELK,✷,B is an extension of ELK,✷, we know that 6⊢ELK,✷ e(ϕ). Thus, by Theorem 1, there exists a
topological subset model X and (x, U) ∈ ES(X) such that (X, x, U) 6|= e(ϕ) and so, by the soundness
of SELK,✷,B, we obtain (X, x, U) 6|= ϕ.
A.2 KD45B and the doxastic fragment LB
Proposition 16. For every ϕ ∈ LB , if ⊢KD45B ϕ, then ⊢SELK,✷,B ϕ.
Proof. It suffices to show that SELK,✷,B derives all the axioms and the rule of inference of KD45B.
(KB) is itself an axiom of SELK,✷,B. It is not hard to see, using (wF) and S4✷, that ⊢SELK,✷,B ¬B⊥;
given this, (DB) follows from (KB) with ψ replaced by ⊥. (4B) follows easily from (sPI) and
(KB). To derive (5B), first observe that by (5K) we have ⊢SELK,✷,B ¬K✸✷ϕ → K¬K✸✷ϕ; from
Proposition 3 it then follows that ⊢SELK,✷,B ¬Bϕ→ K¬Bϕ, and so from (KB) we can deduce (5B).
Lastly, (NecB) follows directly from (NecK) together with (KB).
Theorem 17. KD45B is a sound and complete axiomatization of LB with respect to the class of
all topological subset spaces: for every ϕ ∈ LB , ϕ is provable in KD45B if and only if ϕ is valid in
all topological subset models.
Soundness follows immediately from Proposition 16 together with the soundness of SELK,✷,B
(Corollary 14). The remainder of this section is devoted to developing the tools needed to prove
completeness. Our proof relies crucially on the standard Kripke-style interpretation of LB in re-
lational models and the completeness results pertaining thereto. We therefore begin with a brief
review of these notions (for a more comprehensive overview, we direct the reader to [12, 13]).
A relational frame is a pair (X,R) where X is a nonempty set and R is a binary relation on X .
A relational model is a relational frame (X,R) equipped with a valuation function v : prop→ 2X .
The language LB is interpreted in a relational model M = (X,R, v) by extending the valuation
function via the standard recursive clauses for the Boolean connectives together with the following:
(M,x) |= Bϕ iff (∀y ∈ X)(xRy implies (M, y) |= ϕ).
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Let ‖ϕ‖M = {x ∈ X : (M,x) |= ϕ}. A belief frame is a frame (X,R) where R is serial, transitive,
and Euclidean.10
Theorem 18. KD45B is a sound and complete axiomatization of LB with respect to the class of
belief frames.
Proof. See, e.g., [13, Chapter 5] or [12, Chapters 2, 4].
A frame (X,R) is called a brush if there exists a nonempty subset C ⊆ X such that R = X×C.
If such a C exists, clearly it is unique; call it the final cluster of the brush. A brush is called a pin
if |X C| = 1. It is not hard to see that every brush is a belief frame. Conversely, the following
Lemma shows that every belief frame (X,R) is a disjoint union of brushes.11
Lemma 19. Let (X,R) be a belief frame, and define
x ∼ y iff (∃z ∈ X)(xRz and yRz).
Then ∼ is an equivalence relation extending R. Moreover, if [x] denotes the equivalence class of x
under ∼, then ([x], R|[x]) is a brush, and (X,R) is the disjoint union of all such brushes.
Proof. Reflexivity of ∼ follows from seriality of R, and symmetry is immediate. To see that ∼ is
transitive, suppose x ∼ x′ and x′ ∼ x′′. Then there exist y, z ∈ X such that xRy, x′Ry, x′Rz and
x′′Rz. Because R is Euclidean, it follows that yRz; because R is transitive, we can deduce that
xRz; it follows that x ∼ x′′. To see that ∼ extends R, suppose xRy. Then because R is Euclidean,
we have yRy, which implies x ∼ y.
The fact that ∼ is an equivalence relation tells us that the sets [x] partition X ; furthermore,
since xRy implies [x] = [y], we also know that the sets R|[x] partition R. Thus (X,R) is the disjoint
union of the frames ([x], R|[x]).
Finally we show that each such frame ([x], R|[x]) is a brush. Set Cx = {y ∈ [x] : yRy}; that
Cx 6= ∅ follows easily from R being serial and Euclidean. Let y ∈ Cx. Then for all x
′ ∈ [x] we have
x′ ∼ y, so there is some z ∈ X with x′Rz and yRz; now because R is Euclidean, we can deduce that
zRy, so by transitivity x′Ry. It follows that [x]×{y} ⊆ R, hence [x]×Cx ⊆ R. On the other hand,
if y /∈ Cx, then for every x′ ∈ [x] we have ¬(x′Ry), or else the Euclidean property would imply
yRy, a contradiction. Thus, R|[x] = [x]× Cx, so ([x], R|[x]) is a brush with final cluster Cx.
Corollary 20. KD45B is a sound and complete axiomatization of LB with respect to the class of
brushes and with respect to the class of pins.
There is a close connection between the relational semantics for LB presented above and our
topological semantics for this language. For any frame (X,R), let R+ denote the reflexive closure
of R:
R+ = R ∪ {(x, x) : x ∈ X}.
Given a transitive frame (X,R), the set BR+ = {R
+(x) : x ∈ X} constitutes a topological basis on
X ; denote by TR+ the topology generated by BR+ (see, e.g., [10, 32] for a more detailed discussion
of this construction). It is well-known that (X,TR+) is an Alexandroff space and, for every x ∈ X ,
the set R+(x) is the smallest open neighborhood of x.
10A relation is serial if (∀x)(∃y)(xRy); it is transitive if (∀x, y, z)((xRy & yRz) ⇒ xRz); it is Euclidean if
(∀x, y, z)((xRy & xRz)⇒ yRz).
11A frame (X,R) is said to be a disjoint union of frames (Xi, Ri) provided the Xi partition X and the Ri partition
R.
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Lemma 21. Let (X,R) be a belief frame. For each x ∈ X, let Cx denote the final cluster of the
brush ([x], R|[x]) as in Lemma 19, and let int and cl denote the interior and closure operators,
respectively, in the topological space (X,TR+). Then for all x ∈ X and every A ⊆ X:
1. [x] ∈ TR+ , and so (x, [x]) ∈ ES(XM );
2. R(x) = Cx ∈ TR+ ;
3. int(A) ∩ Cx 6= ∅ if and only if A ⊇ Cx;
4. cl(A) ⊇ [x] if and only if A ∩ Cx 6= ∅.
Proof.
1. This follows from the fact that y ∈ [x] implies R+(y) ⊆ [x], which in turn follows from the
fact that ∼ extends R (Lemma 19).
2. That R(x) = Cx follows from the fact that R|[x] = [x] × Cx (Lemma 19). To see that Cx is
open, observe that if y ∈ Cx, then R+(y) = R(y) = Cy = Cx.
3. Since Cx is open, it follows immediately that if A ⊇ Cx then int(A) ⊇ Cx, so in particular
int(A) ∩Cx 6= ∅. Conversely, if y ∈ int(A) ∩Cx then R+(y) ⊆ A, since R+(y) is the smallest
open neigbourhood of y; therefore, since R+(y) = R(y) = Cx, we have A ⊇ Cx.
4. First suppose that y ∈ A ∩ Cx and let z ∈ [x]. By part 2, R+(z) ⊇ R(z) = Cx, and so since
R+(z) is the smallest open neighbourhood of z and y ∈ Cx, it follows that z ∈ cl({y}) ⊆ cl(A),
hence [x] ⊆ cl(A). Conversely, suppose that A ∩ Cx = ∅. Then since Cx is open it follows
that Cx ∩ cl(A) = ∅, which shows that [x] 6⊆ cl(A).
Given a transitive modelM = (X,R, v), let XM denote the topological subset model constructed
from M , namely (X,TR+ , v).
Lemma 22. Let M = (X,R, v) be a belief frame. Then for every formula ϕ ∈ LB , for every x ∈ X
we have
(M,x) |= ϕ iff (XM , x, [x]) |= ϕ.
Proof. The proof follows by induction on the structure of ϕ; cases for the primitive propositions and
the Boolean connectives are elementary. So assume inductively that the result holds for ϕ; we must
show that it holds also for Bϕ. Note that the inductive hypothesis implies that [[ϕ]][x] = ‖ϕ‖M ∩ [x],
since by Lemma 19, y ∈ [x] implies [y] = [x].
(M,x) |= Bϕ iff R(x) ⊆ ‖ϕ‖M
iff Cx ⊆ ‖ϕ‖M (Lemma 21.2)
iff Cx ⊆ ‖ϕ‖M ∩ [x] (since Cx ⊆ [x])
iff Cx ⊆ [[ϕ]]
[x] (inductive hypothesis)
iff int([[ϕ]][x]) ∩ Cx 6= ∅ (Lemma 21.3)
iff cl(int([[ϕ]][x])) ⊇ [x] (Lemma 21.4)
iff (XM , x, [x]) |= Bϕ.
Completeness is an easy consequence of this lemma: if ϕ ∈ LB is such that 6⊢KD45B ϕ, then by
Theorem 18 there is a belief frame M that refutes ϕ at some point x. Then, by Lemma 22, ϕ is
also refuted in XM at the epistemic scenario (x, [x]). This completes the proof of Theorem 17.
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A.3 Soundness and completeness of ELK,✷,B
Theorem 23. ELK,✷,B is a sound axiomatization of LK,✷,B with respect to the class of all topo-
logical subset spaces under e-d semantics.
Proof. The validity of the axioms without the modality B follows as in Theorem 1, since the only
difference here lies in the semantic clause for B. Let X = (X,T, v) be a topological subset model,
(x, U, V ) an e-d scenario, and ϕ, ψ ∈ LK,✷,B.
(KB) Suppose (x, U, V ) |= B(ϕ → ψ) and (x, U, V ) |= Bϕ. This means V ⊆ [[ϕ → ψ]]
U,V =
(U \[[ϕ]]U,V )∪[[ψ]]U,V and V ⊆ [[ϕ]]U,V , from which we obtain V ⊆ [[ψ]]U,V , i.e., (x, U, V ) |= Bψ.
(sPI) Suppose (x, U, V ) |= Bϕ. This means V ⊆ [[ϕ]]U,V . As such, for every y ∈ U we have
(y, U, V ) |= Bϕ, which implies that [[Bϕ]]U,V = U , so (x, U, V ) |= KBϕ.
(KB) Suppose (x, U, V ) |= Kϕ. This means [[ϕ]]U,V = U . As V ⊆ U (by definition of (x, U, V )), we
obtain (x, U, V ) |= Bϕ.
(RB) Suppose (x, U, V ) |= Bϕ. This means V ⊆ [[ϕ]]U,V . Thus, since V is open, we obtain V ⊆
int([[ϕ]]U,V ). As int([[ϕ]]U,V ) = [[✷ϕ]]U,V , we have V ⊆ [[✷ϕ]]U,V , i.e., (x, U, V ) |= B✷ϕ.
Completeness follows from a fairly straightforward canonical model construction, similar to the
completeness proof of ELK,✷ in [11]. Roughly speaking, we extend the canonical model in [11] in
order to be able to prove the truth lemma for the belief modality B.
Let Xc be the set of all maximal ELK,✷,B-consistent sets of formulas. Define binary relations ∼
and R on Xc by
x ∼ y iff (∀ϕ ∈ LK,✷,B)(Kϕ ∈ x ⇔ Kϕ ∈ y)12
and
xRy iff (∀ϕ ∈ LK,✷,B)(Bϕ ∈ x ⇒ ϕ ∈ y).
It is not hard to see that ∼ is an equivalence relation, hence, it induces equivalence classes on Xc.
Let [x] denote the equivalence class of x induced by the relation ∼ and let R(x) = {y ∈ Xc | xRy}.
Define ϕ̂ = {y ∈ Xc | ϕ ∈ y}, so x ∈ ϕ̂ iff ϕ ∈ x.
The axioms of ELK,✷,B that relate K and B induce the following important links between ∼
and R:
Lemma 24. For any x, y ∈ Xc, the following holds:
1. if x ∼ y then (∀ϕ ∈ LK,✷,B)(Bϕ ∈ x iff Bϕ ∈ y);
2. if x ∼ y then R(x) = R(y);
3. R(x) ⊆ [x];
4. either R(x) ∩R(y) = ∅ or R(x) = R(y).
Proof. Let x, y ∈ Xc.
1. Suppose x ∼ y and let ϕ ∈ LK,✷,B such that Bϕ ∈ x. By (sPI), we have KBϕ ∈ x. As
x ∼ y, we have KBϕ ∈ y. Thus, by (TK), we conclude Bϕ ∈ y. The other direction follows
analogously.
12In fact, this is equivalent to (∀ϕ ∈ LK,✷,B)(Kϕ ∈ x ⇒ ϕ ∈ y), since K is an S5 modality.
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2. Suppose x ∼ y and take z ∈ R(x); let ϕ ∈ LK,✷,B be such that Bϕ ∈ y. Since x ∼ y, by
Lemma 24.1, we have Bϕ ∈ x. Therefore, z ∈ R(x) implies that ϕ ∈ z. This shows that
z ∈ R(y), hence R(x) ⊆ R(y). The reverse inclusion follows similarly.
3. Let z ∈ R(x) and ϕ ∈ LK,✷,B; we will show that Kϕ ∈ x iff Kϕ ∈ z. Suppose Kϕ ∈ x. Then,
by (4K), we have KKϕ ∈ x. This implies, by (KB), that BKϕ ∈ x. Hence, since z ∈ R(x),
we obtain Kϕ ∈ z. For the converse, suppose Kϕ 6∈ x, i.e., ¬Kϕ ∈ x. Then, by (5K), we
have K¬Kϕ ∈ x. Again by (KB), we obtain B¬Kϕ ∈ x. Thus, since z ∈ R(x), we obtain
¬Kϕ ∈ z, i.e., Kϕ 6∈ z. We therefore conclude that z ∈ [x], hence R(x) ⊆ [x].
4. Suppose R(x)∩R(y) 6= ∅. This means there is z ∈ Xc such that z ∈ R(x) and z ∈ R(y). Then,
by Lemma 24.3, we have x ∼ z and y ∼ z. Thus, by Lemma 24.2, R(x) = R(z) = R(y).
Let Tc be the topology on Xc generated by the collection
B = {[x] ∩ ✷̂ϕ | x ∈ Xc, ϕ ∈ LK,✷,B} ∪ {R(x) ∩ ✷̂ϕ | x ∈ X
c, ϕ ∈ LK,✷,B}.
It is not hard to prove that B is in fact a basis for Tc. Define the canonical model Xc to be the
tuple (Xc,Tc, vc), where vc(p) = p̂. Observe that since ✷̂⊤ = Xc, we have [x], R(x) ∈ Tc for all
x ∈ Xc; therefore, by Lemma 24.3, for each x ∈ Xc the tuple (x, [x], R(x)) is an e-d scenario.
Lemma 25 (Truth Lemma). For every ϕ ∈ LK,✷,B and for each x ∈ X
c,
ϕ ∈ x iff (Xc, x, [x], R(x)) |= ϕ.
Proof. The proof proceeds as usual by induction on the structure of ϕ; cases for the primitive
propositions and the Boolean connectives are elementary and the case for K is presented in [11,
Theorem 1, p. 16]. So assume inductively that the result holds for ϕ; we must show that it holds
also for ✷ϕ and Bϕ.
Case for ✷ϕ:
(⇒) Let ✷ϕ ∈ x. Then, observe that x ∈ ✷̂ϕ ∩ [x] ⊆ {y ∈ [x] | ϕ ∈ y} (by x ∈ [x] and (T✷)).
Since ✷̂ϕ ∩ [x] is open, it follows that
x ∈ int{y ∈ [x] | ϕ ∈ y} (1)
By (IH), we also have
{y ∈ [x] | ϕ ∈ y} = {y ∈ [x] | (y, [y], R(y)) |= ϕ}
= {y ∈ [x] | (y, [x], R(x)) |= ϕ} (Lemma 24)
= [[ϕ]][x],R(x)
Therefore, by (1), we conclude that x ∈ int([[ϕ]][x],R(x)), i.e., (x, [x], R(x)) |= ✷ϕ.
(⇐) Now suppose that (x, [x], R(x)) |= ✷ϕ. This means, by the semantics, that x ∈ int([[ϕ]][x],R(x)).
As above, this is equivalent to x ∈ int{y ∈ [x] | ϕ ∈ y}. It then follows that there exists
U ∈ B such that
x ∈ U ⊆ {y ∈ [x] | ϕ ∈ y}.
By definition of B, the basic open neighbourhood U can be of the following forms:
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1. U = [z] ∩ ✷̂ψ, for some z ∈ Xc and ψ ∈ LK,✷,B;
2. U = R(z) ∩ ✷̂ψ, for some z ∈ Xc and ψ ∈ LK,✷,B.
However, since x ∈ U , we can simply replace the above cases by:
1. U = [x] ∩ ✷̂ψ, for some ψ ∈ LK,✷,B;
2. U = R(x) ∩ ✷̂ψ, for some ψ ∈ LK,✷,B, respectively.
The case for U = [x] ∩ ✷̂ψ follows similarly as in [11, Theorem 1, p. 16]. We here only
prove the case for U = R(x) ∩ ✷̂ψ. We therefore have
x ∈ R(x) ∩ ✷̂ψ ⊆ {y ∈ [x] | ϕ ∈ y} (2)
This means that for every y ∈ R(x), if ✷ψ ∈ y then ϕ ∈ y. Thus, we obtain that
{χ | Bχ ∈ x} ∪ {¬(✷ψ → ϕ)} is an inconsistent set. Otherwise, it could be extended to
a maximally consistent set y such that y ∈ R(x), ✷ψ ∈ y and ϕ 6∈ y, contradicting (2).
Thus, there exists a finite subset Γ ⊆ {χ | Bχ ∈ x} such that
⊢
∧
χ∈Γ
χ→ (✷ψ → ϕ),
which implies by S4✷ that
⊢
∧
χ∈Γ
✷χ→ ✷(✷ψ → ϕ).
Observe that, since x ∈ R(x), we have {χ | Bχ ∈ x} ⊆ x. Moreover, by (RB), we also
obtain that {✷χ | Bχ ∈ x} ⊆ {χ | Bχ ∈ x} ⊆ x. We therefore obtain that
∧
χ∈Γ✷χ ∈ x,
thus, that ✷(✷ψ → ϕ) ∈ x. Then, by S4✷, we have ✷ψ → ✷ϕ ∈ x. As x ∈ ✷̂ψ, we
conclude ✷ϕ ∈ x.
Case for Bϕ:
(⇒) Let Bϕ ∈ x. Then, by defn. of R, we have ϕ ∈ y for all y ∈ R(x). Then, by (IH), we
obtain (∀y ∈ R(x))(y, [y], R(y)) |= ϕ. By Lemma 24.3, y ∈ R(x) implies x ∼ y. Thus,
as [y] = [x] and R(x) = R(y) (Lemma 24.2), we obtain, (∀y ∈ R(x))(y, [x], R(x)) |= ϕ.
This means, R(x) ⊆ [[ϕ]][x],R(x), thus, (x, [x], R(x)) |= Bϕ.
(⇐) Let Bϕ 6∈ x. This implies, {ψ | Bψ ∈ x} ∪ {¬ϕ} is consistent. Otherwise, there exists a
finite subset Γ ⊆ {ψ | Bψ ∈ x} such that
⊢
∧
χ∈Γ
χ→ ϕ.
Then, by normality of B,
⊢
∧
χ∈Γ
Bχ→ Bϕ.
Since Bχ ∈ x for all χ ∈ Γ, we have Bϕ ∈ x, contradicting the fact that x is a consistent
set.
22
Then, by Lindenbaum’s Lemma, {ψ | Bψ ∈ x} ∪ {¬ϕ} can be extended to a maximally
consistent set y. ¬ϕ ∈ y means that ϕ 6∈ y. Thus, by IH, (y, [y], R(y)) 6|= ϕ. Since
{ψ | Bψ ∈ x} ⊆ y, we have y ∈ R(x). This means, by Lemma 24.3 and Lemma
24.2, [y] = [x] and R(x) = R(y). Therefore, as [y] = [x] and R(x) = R(y), we have
(y, [x], R(x)) 6|= ϕ. Thus, y ∈ R(x) but y 6∈ [[ϕ]][x],R(x) implying that (x, [x], R(x)) 6|=
Bϕ.
Moreover, Lemma 24.3 guarantees that the evaluation tuple (x, [x], R(x)) is of desired kind
(more precisely, the construction of the canonical model guarantees that R(x) ∈ Tc, for all x ∈ Xc
and the aforementioned lemma makes sure that R(x) ⊆ [x].)
Corollary 26. ELK,✷,B is a complete axiomatization of LK,✷,B with respect to the class of all
topological subset spaces under e-d semantics.
Proof. Let ϕ ∈ LK,✷,B such that 6⊢ELK,✷,B ϕ. Then, {¬ϕ} is consistent and can be extended to a
maximally consistent set x ∈ Xc. Then, by Lemma 25, we obtain that (Xc, x, [x], R(x)) 6|= ϕ.
A.4 Consistent belief and weak factivity
Proposition 27. ELK,✷,B + (DB) is a sound axiomatization of LK,✷,B with respect to the class of
all topological subset spaces under e-d semantics for consistent e-d scenarios.
Proof. The validity of the axioms of ELK,✷,B follows as in Theorem 23, we only need to prove
the validity of (DB) for consistent e-d scenarios. Let X = (X,T, v) be a topological subset model,
(x, U, V ) a consistent e-d scenario, and ϕ ∈ LK,✷,B.
(DB) Suppose (x, U, V ) |= Bϕ. This means V ⊆ [[ϕ]]
U,V . Then, since V 6= ∅, we have V 6⊆ U\[[ϕ]]U,V ,
therefore, (x, U, V ) |= ¬B¬ϕ.
The completeness proof follows similarly to the completeness proof of ELK,✷,B and the only
difference lies in the requirement of a consistent e-d scenario in the corresponding Truth Lemma.
We therefore only need to prove that the canonical epistemic scenario (x, [x], R(x)) of the system
ELK,✷,B+(DB) is consistent, i.e., we need to show that R(x) 6= ∅ for any maximally consistent sets
of ELK,✷,B + (DB). The canonical model for the system ELK,✷,B + (DB) is constructed as usual,
exactly the same way as the one for ELK,✷,B.
Lemma 28. The relation R of the canonical model Xc = (Xc,Tc, νc) for the system ELK,✷,B+(DB)
is serial.
Proof. For any x ∈ Xc, the set {ψ | Bψ ∈ x} is consistent. Otherwise, there is a finite subset
Γ ⊆ {ψ | Bψ ∈ x} and ϕ ∈ {ψ | Bψ ∈ x} such that
⊢
∧
χ∈Γ
χ→ ¬ϕ.
Then, by normality of B,
⊢
∧
χ∈Γ
Bχ→ B¬ϕ.
Since Bχ ∈ x for all χ ∈ Γ, we have B¬ϕ ∈ x. On the other hand, since Bϕ ∈ x and ⊢
Bϕ → ¬B¬ϕ ((DB)-axiom), we obtain ¬B¬ϕ ∈ x, contradicting the fact that x a maximally
consistent set. Therefore, {ψ | Bψ ∈ x} can be extended to a maximally consistent set y and, since
{ψ | Bψ ∈ x} ⊆ y, we have xRy.
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Corollary 29. Let Xc = (Xc,Tc, νc) be the canonical model of the system ELK,✷,B + (DB). Then,
for all x ∈ Xc, we have R(x) 6= ∅.
Proposition 30. ELK,✷,B + (DB) is a complete axiomatization of LK,✷,B with respect to the class
of all topological subset spaces under e-d semantics for consistent e-d scenarios.
Proof. Follows from Corollary 29 similarly to the proof of Corollary 26.
Proposition 31. ELK,✷,B + (wF) is a sound axiomatization of LK,✷,B with respect to the class of
all topological subset spaces under e-d semantics for dense e-d scenarios.
Proof. The validity of the axioms of ELK,✷,B follows as in Theorem 23, we only need to prove the
validity of (wF) for dense e-d scenarios. Let X = (X,T, v) be a topological subset model, (x, U, V )
a dense e-d scenario, and ϕ ∈ LK,✷,B.
(wF) Suppose (x, U, V ) |= Bϕ. This means V ⊆ [[ϕ]]U,V . Then, since x ∈ U ⊆ cl(V ), we obtain
x ∈ U ⊆ cl([[ϕ]]U,V ), meaning that (x, U, V ) |= ✸ϕ.
The completeness result for ELK,✷,B+(wF) follows similarly to the above case: the only key step
we need to show is that the canonical epistemic scenario (x, [x], R(x)) of the system ELK,✷,B+(DB)
is dense.
Lemma 32. Let Xc = (Xc,Tc, νc) be the canonical model of the system ELK,✷,B + (wF). Then,
for all x ∈ Xc, we have that R(x) is dense in [x], i.e., that [x] ⊆ cl(R(x)).
Proof. Let x ∈ Xc and y ∈ [x]. We want to show that y ∈ cl(R(x)), i.e., for all U ∈ B with y ∈ U ,
we should show that U ∩R(x) 6= ∅ holds. Let U ∈ B such that y ∈ U . By definition of B, the basic
open neighbourhood U can be of the following forms:
1. U = R(z) ∩ ✷̂ϕ, for some z ∈ Xc and ϕ ∈ LK,✷,B;
2. U = [z] ∩ ✷̂ϕ, for some z ∈ Xc and ϕ ∈ LK,✷,B.
However, since y ∈ [x] and y ∈ U , we can simply replace the above cases by:
1. U = R(x) ∩ ✷̂ϕ, for some ϕ ∈ LK,✷,B;
2. U = [x] ∩ ✷̂ϕ, for some ϕ ∈ LK,✷,B, respectively.
If (1) is the case, the result follows trivially since y ∈ U = R(x) ∩ ✷̂ϕ = U ∩R(x).
If (2) is the case, U ∩R(x) = ([x] ∩ ✷̂ϕ) ∩R(x) = ✷̂ϕ ∩ R(x) (by Lemma 24.3). Therefore, we
need to show that R(x) ∩ ✷̂ϕ 6= ∅:
Consider the set {ψ | Bψ ∈ y} ∪ {✷ϕ}. This set is consistent, otherwise, there exists a finite
subset Γ ⊆ {ψ | Bψ ∈ y} such that
⊢
∧
χ∈Γ
χ→ ✸¬ϕ.
Then, by normality of B,
⊢
∧
χ∈Γ
Bχ→ B✸¬ϕ.
We also have
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1. ⊢ B✸¬ϕ→ ✸✸¬ϕ (wF)
2. ⊢ ✸✸¬ϕ→ ✸¬ϕ (4✷)
3. ⊢ B✸¬ϕ→ ✸¬ϕ CPL: 1, 2
Hence,
⊢
∧
χ∈Γ
Bχ→ ✸¬ϕ.
Therefore, since Bχ ∈ y for all χ ∈ Γ, we have ✸¬ϕ ∈ y. But we know that ✷ϕ(:= ¬✸¬ϕ) ∈ y
(since y ∈ U = [x] ∩ ✷̂ϕ), contradicting the maximal consistency of y. Therefore, {ψ | Bψ ∈
y} ∪ {✷ϕ} is consistent. Moreover, by Lindenbaum’s Lemma, it can be extended to a maximally
consistent set z. Therefore, as {ψ | Bψ ∈ y} ⊆ z, we have z ∈ R(y) = R(x) (since y ∈ [x], we
have R(x) = R(y) (by Lemma 24.2)). Moreover, ✷ϕ ∈ z, i.e., z ∈ ✷̂ϕ. We therefore conclude that
z ∈ ✷̂ϕ ∩R(x) 6= ∅.
Corollary 33. Let Xc = (Xc,Tc, νc) be the canonical model of the system ELK,✷,B + (wF). Then,
for all x ∈ Xc, the e-d scenario (x, [x], R(x)) is dense.
Proposition 34. ELK,✷,B + (wF) is a complete axiomatization of LK,✷,B with respect to the class
of all topological subset spaces under e-d semantics for dense e-d scenarios.
Proof. Follows from Corollary 33 similarly to the proof of Corollary 26.
A.5 Confident belief
Lemma 35. Let X be a topological space and A an open subset of X. Then for any B ⊆ X, we
have A ⊆∗ B iff A ⊆ cl(int(B)).
Proof. First suppose that A 6⊆ cl(int(B)). Then there is some x ∈ A and some open set U with
x ∈ U and U ∩ int(B) = ∅. Since A is open, so is U ∩A. In fact, U ∩A ⊆ cl(A B); to see this, take
any y ∈ U ∩ A and any open V containing y and observe that if V ∩ (A B) = ∅, then it follows
that V ∩ A ⊆ B, and therefore y ∈ V ∩ U ∩ A ⊆ int(B), so y ∈ U ∩ int(B), a contradiction. We
have therefore shown that int(cl (A B)) 6= ∅, so A 6⊆∗ B.
Conversely, suppose that A 6⊆∗ B. Then there is some nonempty open set U with U ⊆ cl(A B).
Note that this implies that U ∩ (A B) 6= ∅, so in particular there is some x ∈ U ∩A. Observe that
(A∩ int(B))∩(A B) = ∅; as such, (A∩ int(B))∩cl (A B) = ∅, so we must have U ∩A∩ int(B) = ∅.
It then follows that (U ∩ A) ∩ cl(int(B)) = ∅; this shows that x /∈ cl(int(B)), so since x ∈ A, we
have A 6⊆ cl(int(B)).
Let α : LK,✷,B → LK,✷,B be the map that replaces every occurence of B with B✸✷.
Lemma 36. For all topological subset models X and every e-d scenario (x, U, V ) therein, we have
(X, x, U, V ) |≈ ϕ iff (X, x, U, V ) |= α(ϕ).
Proof. This follows from Lemma 35 using structural induction on ϕ.
Lemma 37. For all ϕ ∈ LK,✷,B, if ⊢ELK,✷,B α(ϕ), then ⊢ELK,✷,B+(CB) ϕ.
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Proof. This follows by structural induction on ϕ using the easy fact that ⊢ELK,✷,B+(CB) Bϕ ↔
B✸✷ϕ.
Theorem 38. ELK,✷,B + (CB) is a complete axiomatization of LK,✷,B with respect to the class of
all topological subset spaces under e-d semantics using the semantics given above: for all formulas
ϕ ∈ LK,✷,B, if |≈ ϕ, then ⊢ELK,✷,B+(CB) ϕ.
Proof. Suppose that |≈ ϕ. Then by Lemma 36 we know that |= α(ϕ). By Corollary 26, then, we
can deduce that ⊢ELK,✷,B α(ϕ), and so by Lemma 37 we obtain ⊢ELK,✷,B+(CB) ϕ, as desired.
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